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TRANSPORTATION - It is true that a high-speed train can be three times faster than driving. The motivation to do just that is sincere and exciting. In fact, an approved statewide measure in 2008, mandated a nonstop travel time of 2 hours and 40 minutes from San Francisco to Los Angeles.
But while the ambition was there, the performance was not. Originally, the connection with San Francisco was planned for 2020, now years behind schedule and about $100 billion over its original budget. To add to its many afflictions, the Trump Administration terminated two grants totaling $4 billion because of apparent project defaults which include missed deadlines, budget shortfalls, and overrepresentation of projected ridership.
For me, this dreadful outcome was predictable. Lessons learned from over thirty years as a member of the board of directors of the Southern California Rapid Transit District, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and as an unpaid volunteer overseeing several city, county and state projects provide me with an insider’s experience to identify what constitutes the keys to a successful project delivery. Sadly, those crucial keys never developed for the state’s high-speed rail, although the high-priced consultants who were hired by the California High-Speed Rail Authority (CHSRA) were previously involved in projects that failed because they did not apply the following three keys for a successful project delivery.
1) Right of Way and Permits
2) Infrastructure/Utilities
3) Agreements.
The CHSRA was created by the State Legislature and the Governor in 1996 and was tasked to prepare a plan and design for construction of an economically viable high speed train line linking major metropolitan areas to help sustain the state’s long-term mobility and economic growth.
In its November 2008 Business Plan, the rail authority claimed that after more than a decade of research, planning, engineering, environmental and economic review, and public and legislative debate, an 800-mile high-speed train system with speeds up to 220 mph between Northern and Southern California was poised to move towards construction.
But it was a faulty start. The largest public construction project in state history had just ten employees to manage it and oversee it. Rather than hiring in-house engineers and rail experts, the state authority was convinced to turn over this massive mission to consultants. And it did, to the point where consultants, like a flood, inundated the project. A bizarre setting ensued whereby government employees reported to consultants, and consultants managed other consultants. A bureaucratic nightmare emerged and reigned.
This project was touted as a job creator, but truth be told, when jobs emerged, and multiplied, they were snatched up by a bevy of consultant groups, contractors and manipulators who had contributed heavily to campaign finances, expressly for the bond initiative that funded the project. And now, when voices are raised to stop the project, the beneficiaries; unions, contractors and consultants who finance the politicians` campaigns, sing the same song. "The project is creating jobs". Lost is money that could be diverted to productive economic engines such as affordable housing, clean energy, water desalination, repair of a grumbling infrastructure, and other worthy projects.
As an example, one consulting firm alone had about 470 employees—and hired many other consultants—who were spread across offices in Sacramento, Fresno, and San Francisco. Not surprising, the inducements were imposing. Contracts for consultants averaged $427,000 per engineer, compared to rail authority and in-house costs of $131,000 per engineer, according to state budget documents.
Further, another consulting firm initially estimated annual train ridership at 90 million, assuming 90% of motorists would switch to trains. The high calculations supported high revenue projections. After a University of California at Riverside professor reviewed the estimates and identified issues, the projection dropped to 25 million—a reduction shockingly described as minor!
A state inspector general report published in February found that progress on 52 miles of track not yet under construction will face delay due to challenges over agreements to relocate facilities like power lines and water supply. If a master schedule had been developed which identified major steps, and updated every six months with transparency, detecting progress and obstacles, the issue surrounding utilities would have been resolved, as would have storm water management and vehicular roadway capacity.
I confronted cost overruns and schedule delays due to poor planning, especially utility relocation, with Metro’s widening of the 405 freeway, and demanded and obtained changes. Metro now addresses this by awarding utility relocation as a separate contract before main construction. Additionally, I moved rapidly to curb delays that resulted in prolonged negotiations over land acquisitions.
While consultants are involved in most state construction projects, in the case of the high-speed rail they hold unparalleled status. And they appear to be a permanent fixture. From office space to computers and servers and software used to manage the project, all are the property of consultants. Critics have referred to the operation as a “consultants-captured” organization.
One major step to be taken is to unload the money guzzlers retained, such as the contractor who collected over $40 million by simply parking a couple of trailers on the site for oner a year without performing work, only because the high-speed rail agency awarded the contract without first having procession of the land.
A government project must have governmental leadership, a professional with strong skills and the ability to motivate, influence, and negotiate, and manage the expertise of consultants. And an early requirement must be the updating of agreements with all major players, modifying charters with municipal hierarchies, and identifying the person in charge for each primary function. It is also shameful and detrimental to the project the high turnover of executives in both sides of the aisle, authority and consultants.
The high-speed rail project was the brainchild of Gov. Jerry Brown, and it subsequently received the dedicated support of governors Pete Wilson and Arnold Schwarzenegger. Now it is in the hands of Gov. Gavin Newsom—and it does not have to become "Newsom`s White Elephant." It can be revitalized and sculpted into the dream held by many, a fast connection to the mega regions of California, contributing to economic development and job creation.
But the experiences distilled from past activities—the lessons learned—must be applied wisely and carefully, to restore order and project viability. Only then can we anticipate a high-speed rail in California.
(Nick Patsaouras is an electrical engineer and former Metro board member. Parts of this article are drawn from his book "The Making of Modern Los Angeles".)
